This letter to the Editor comments on the article On the limitations of probability in conceptualizing pattern matches in forensic science by P. T. Jayaprakash (Forensic Science International, [10] ).
This position is incorrect on both theoretical and applied grounds. First and foremost, probability theory is of course perfectly well suited to deal with continuous variables [e.g., 17] . If that was not true, then forensic science -if 12 not the whole of science -as we know it today would not be possible. Second, on a practical account, morphological features (e.g., the shape of handwritten characters, as demonstrated in research published elsewhere in this journal 14 [e.g., 14]) can be described, and hence studied, on a quantitative level using statistical methodology.
Both these points are scientific realities, and disregarding them amounts to dismissing a scientific position, which 16 is problematic. The fact that demonstrably wrong assertions are being published in a peer-reviewed journal such as Forensic Science International is a cause of concern. It reveals, and exemplifies, the more fundamental problem that 18 there are forensic commentators who continue to argue that their field of activity is so specialized and distinctive that it cannot be approached with the established concepts that the traditional scientific disciplines provide us. This is 20 a contentious widely accepted belief that is typically promoted by many proponents in the so-called 'identification' or 'individualization' disciplines. Their mode of thinking leads practitioners to endorse the vague, and unnecessary,
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notions of uniqueness and individuality [5, 6] as grounds for categorical claims of (common) source, or as noted by Jakaprakash himself, "(.. This perspective has been fostered by many devoted scholars through decades of fundamental research and has crystallized our current understanding of statistics as the study of reasonable reasoning and decision making in the face of "The philosophical position adopted here is that statistics is essentially the study of uncertainty and that 4 the statistician's role is to assist workers in other fields, the clients, who encounter uncertainty in their work. In practice, there is a restriction in that statistics is ordinarily associated with data; and it is the link 6 between the uncertainty, or variability, in the data and that in the topic itself that has occupied statisticians. Some writers even restrict the data to be frequency data, capable of near-identical repetition. Uncertainty, 8 away from data, has rarely been of statistical interest. Statisticians do not have a monopoly of studies of uncertainty. Probabilists discuss how randomness in one part of a system a↵ects other parts. Thus the model for a stochastic process provides predictions about the data that the process will provide. The passage from process to data is clear; it is when we attempt a reversal and go from data to process that 
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Statistics therefore provides us with the full package that we need to address the real problems in forensic science on an operational level. On the one hand, we have probability theory that allows us to reason coherently in situations 18 characterized by uncertainty. On the other hand, we have decision theory, which instructs us how to use coherently informed beliefs in action. As shown elsewhere [1, 20] , we can state this more explicitly as follows: probability 20 theory allows us to revise our belief about propositions of interest (e.g., propositions of common source), based on results of comparative examinations, which results in an indication as to whether (and if so, to what extent) or not our 22 uncertainty about those propositions ought to be reduced; decision theory instructs us in how to make a decision based on those coherently informed beliefs, that is a decision about whether or not we ought to conclude that two compared 24 items come from a common source.
Can statistics be used to support a 'pet theory' as argued by Jayaprakash, and amount to "(...) imposing unscientific 26 application of statistics for the scholastic pretence of achieving a stamp of authority" [10, p. 6] ? This is a delusive question. Without doubt, it is important to enquire about the meaningful use of statistics, but where this might not be the case, it would not be the fault of statistics, only that of poor application by an errant scientist. The very pet theory is to claim the contrary.
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The bottom-line recommendation made by Jayaprakash is to conduct "(...) further research on the minimum area requirements for point to point qualitative comparison of the continuum patterns relevant for forensic investigation 32 (...)" [10, p. 6] . Personally, it seems contrary to the nature of science to encourage scientists to make the minimum amount of e↵ort to satisfy a requirement. It is also interesting to note that this call is actually self-defeating for the 34 author because, for any research that may be conducted in the area, the ultimate and fundamental question will be: 'How is one to use the research output in an argumentatively sound way?'. The single essential answer to this is that 36 the topic is one in scientific reasoning [9] , of which statistics is a special case. If it is our common aim, including that of this journal, to promote the scientification of forensic science, then it is hard to understand why there are proponents 38 who opine that they could get away without statistics, a troubling concern also raised recently elsewhere [7] . Jayaprakash's discourse seems to suggest that the choice of probability theory is merely one of convenience the inevitability of probability. The laws ensure that several statements of uncertainty cohere" [11, p. 37, text in rectangular brackets added by the author].
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To the best of our knowledge, no forensic scientist has come up yet with a cogent argument to overturn the fundamental tenets of probability theory. Rather, what seems to be the case in forensic science is what Lindley has seen as a prevalent position among statisticians: "The general attitude of statisticians to the Bayesian argument is to turn their heads the other way. You put the argument but most of them don't come back with any real response. In my view, they can't come back with a response, but they do not even try. The most distinguished of statisticians just say "Yes, yes," then turn their heads away and carry on as if nothing had happened. This makes them appear polite." [18, p. 312] 4 Perhaps Jayaprakash seeks to suggests that probability theory may be di cult to apply. This may indeed be a relevant observation, but it is questionable whether this should serve as criterion for choosing or not probability as a 6 framework for reasoning, and hence judging its adequacy. As noted concisely by Friedman: "If applied to take into account all the information we have about a situation, Bayesian analysis requires unrealistically complex calculations, 8 but this does not suggest a problem with the theory. On the contrary, the complexity is in the world surrounding us, and the theory would have limited value if it could not in principle represent that complexity. Probability is a flexible 10 template. It can take into account as much complexity as its user is able to handle" [8, p. 1818 ]. Jayaprakash's call for "(...) acknowledging the limitations of probability (...)" [10, p. 6] thus misses the point, and hits the wrong target.
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Instead, what is needed to make forensic practice a science is acknowledgement of the need for an interdisciplinary collaboration with the inference and decision sciences -statistics in particular -that will help us work on (i) common 14 grounds for understanding uncertainty and its handling through probability [13] , (ii) the good practice of operational probability elicitation [15] , and (iii) the mastery of the fundamentals of probability as a basis for decision-making 16 [11] .
